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STRATEGIC LENIENCY: INSIGHTS FROM GAME THEORY 
AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Martynas Jablonskis1
Abstract. Strategic leniency signifies potential exploits of leniency that could generate detrimental effects. 
Leniency could be exploited in three distinct ways: (1) used to punish cartel deviator; (2) used as a cartel exit 
strategy; (3) used as a way to report false cartels hoping that rivals will be fined. Strategic leniency has roots 
in game theory and has been used in theoretical works on leniency. However, it is difficult to verify, whether 
firms actually conceive leniency strategically. The article addresses the problem by analysis of 42 cartel cases, 
investigated by the European Commission, throughout the years 2010–2018. We find some support for the 
strategic leniency, but evidence is more indicative, rather than conclusive. We also find that 2002 leniency 
reform in the European Union generated no immediate disruptive effect on pre-reform cartels. Besides the 
article argues for insufficiency of leniency to uncover cartels in a form of concerted practices, and spots a 
seeming legal gap: there are no legal rules in current Leniency Notice to prevent abuses of leniency. Overall, 
the success of leniency should not be overstated.
Keywords: cartels, concerted practices, punishment, prisoner’s dilemma, strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the article is to discuss the idea of strategic leniency in the EU competition law 
and to provide related empirical findings from the EC’s case law. According to the EC, leniency is very 
effective in finding cartels (European Commission, 2020). Currently, there is no comparable alternative 
to leniency for a discovery of cartels at the EU level, therefore leniency will likely remain the primary 
legal tool for cartel detection in a foreseeable future; thus, it is important to examine the effectiveness 
of leniency. In this regard, the article provides the exposition of the idea of strategic leniency that 
comes from economic and game theory research on leniency. Insights from game theory point to 
potential exploits of leniency that may be detrimental or even pro-collusive. The analysis is enriched 
by empirical results from 42 cartel cases, investigated by the EC throughout the years 2010–2018.
The legal mechanism of leniency is rather straightforward: a first undertaking, who reports a 
cartel to the EC, may get full immunity from cartel fines, while all subsequent applicants may get a 
reduction of fines up to 50 % (Leniency Notice, 2006). Leniency rules aim to provide incentives for 
cartel members to report cartels to the EC: in exchange for cooperation, the EC provides immunity 
or a reduction of fines. In this way, cartels, which would remain undiscovered otherwise, are being 
disclosed.
1  PhD candidate in Law, Faculty of Law at the University of Basel and Mykolas Romeris Law School, dissertation title “Oli-
gopoly Problem in the EU Competition Law: Game Theory Perspective”. martynasjablonskis@gmail.com.
Copyright © 2020 Martynas Jablonskis. Published by Vilnius University Press. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative 




Due to the importance and prevalence of leniency in cartel detection2, legal and economic re-
search on leniency is ever-growing. Spagnolo and Marvao (2016) provide a detailed summary of this 
body of research. They identify some problems related to leniency: the idea of too general leniency 
policy; limited effect of leniency on cartel deterrence; too low level of fines; over excessive use of 
leniency; poor leniency designs; empirical problem in establishing positive effects of leniency, etc. 
Miller (2009, p. 751), for instance, even suggests that competition authorities may have incentives 
to overstate the success of leniency. Thus, the EC’s claims of the success of leniency need to be taken 
with caution. In this line of research, we further investigate the topic and focus on three specific 
issues of leniency described below.
(1) The issue of leniency and concerted practices. Leniency Notice (2006, item 1 of section I) 
defines cartels both as cartel agreements and/or concerted practices. These two forms of cartels 
differ in many important aspects, such as the complexity of cartel arrangement, traceable evidence, 
intensity of communication, etc.; not to mention, legal differences in proving these infringements. 
Based on that, we put forward the idea that the statements on the effectiveness of leniency need 
to be qualified, depending on the form of a cartel. In other words, leniency rules might be effective 
against cartel agreements, but at the same time, may not work for concerted practices (tacit collu-
sion), which is comparably more difficult to detect and prove from a legal point of view. This remark 
has implications for theoretical models of leniency that, especially in economic research, tend to 
abstract from legal differences among distinct types of cartels (Spagnolo, 2000; Motta and Polo, 2003; 
Harrington, 2008; Chen and Rey, 2013). In particular, modeling parameters like a probability of detec-
tion or a probability of proving concerted practices outside the framework of leniency actually might 
be very low, making these parameters of limited use in formal models of leniency. Thus, theoretical 
results obtained by these models might be valid for cartel agreements, and not necessarily extend 
to concerted practices. In section II we elaborate further on why leniency is problematic to apply in 
cases of concerted practices, and section V empirically reinforces the observation.
(2) The issue of strategic leniency. Strategic leniency could be defined as a set of ways that firms 
could employ to exploit leniency. In turn, strategic leniency could generate undesirable pro-collusive 
effects. The idea comes from game theory considerations of leniency rules. Based on examined 
literature, we could distinguish three different ways of strategic leniency: leniency as a punishment; 
leniency as a cartel exit strategy; false leniency submission. Section III describes the basic logic 
behind these three different ways of strategic leniency. Yet, the key problem is to verify, if firms 
actually employ leniency strategically. Therefore, in section V, we provide empirical findings related 
to strategic leniency.
(3) The issue of the disruptive effect of leniency. Disruption and deterrence are the two main 
effects of leniency on cartels. Deterrence refers to ex ante prevention of cartel formation, whereas 
disruption points to ex post effect of leniency making already existing cartels less stable. A success-
ful leniency policy must generate both of these effects. However, the problem lies in their empirical 
2  During the years 2010–2018, around 90 % of all cartel cases dealt by the EC originated from leniency applications 
(section V).
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verification: even if we can observe frequency (number) and fluctuation (increase and decrease) of 
leniency applications, the total number of cartels in all markets remains unknown (Harrington, 2008, 
p. 238). Therefore, a simple increase in the frequency of leniency applications is only an indicative 
metric for measuring the effectiveness of leniency. Looking historically, the 1993 leniency reform in 
the U.S. has been widely regarded as a major improvement of leniency rules because the frequency 
of leniency applications increased significantly. Spagnolo (2008, p. 266) emphasizes that this seeming 
success of 1993 leniency reform is mainly because of the introduction of “automatic leniency”, i.e. 
the limitation of competition authority’s discretion in granting or rejecting full immunity. In the EU 
similar reform took place in 2002. Thus, assuming that in 2002 leniency rules became very effective, 
we could assess, whether pre-reform cartels collapsed soon after the reform, i.e. whether 2002 le-
niency reform generated observable disruptive effect. For that matter, section V sheds light on the 
disruptive effect of leniency as well as provides general empirical observations related to leniency.
Structure and contributions. The structure of the article follows the issues described above. 
The article contributes by the exposition and the attempt to empirically verify the idea of strategic 
leniency. The idea itself is not entirely new. Yet, in the examined literature strategic aspects of leni-
ency tend to be explored on a theoretical level without empirical verification. Also, it appears that 
leniency has the gap: currently, there are no legal rules to prevent abuses of leniency; this gap could 
be rectified by amending Leniency Notice (2006). Also, the article contributes by emphasizing the 
limitations of leniency with regards to concerted practices and providing empirical findings, which 
might be useful for further research on the topic.
I I. LENIENCY: CONCERTED PRACTICES
The main idea of this section is that the effectiveness of leniency may depend on the type of cartel. 
We further provide reasons, why leniency might not work against concerted practices. Article 101 of 
TFEU distinguishes cartel agreements from concerted practices. These distinct types of cartels differ, 
for instance, in terms of complexity, intensity, evidence left, and many other parameters. According 
to the CJEU, concerted practices are the least intense form of a cartel (Commission of the European 
Communities v. Anic Partecipazioni SpA, 1991, §131). It is usually proven by indirect evidence, thus 
firms could find it difficult to adduce a coherent body of evidence for leniency. In general, tacit and 
indirect nature of concerted practices makes leniency applications more difficult, compared to cases 
of cartel agreements.
Also, the definition of concerted practices is rather vague (Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Com-
mission of the European Communities, 1972, §64). One can think of concerted practices as a concept, 
which defines the scope of the whole Article 101 of TFEU. Therefore, it is a natural reason, why the 
concept is defined in broad and general terms. Despite that, it causes a problem of the distinction 
between concerted practices and conscious parallelism, which is especially stark in oligopolies; this 
legal problem is also referred to as the oligopoly problem (Petit, 2013). In particular, parallel behaviour 
could result both from concerted practices (illegal) and conscious parallelism (legal). Hence, not only 
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there is a practical problem to adduce coherent body of evidence of concerted practices for leniency, 
but also a conceptual problem to distinguish, whether “practices” are concerted. 
Finally, not only the outer boundary between concerted practices and conscious parallelism is 
not clear, but also the inner boundary between concerted practices and agreement is not in place. 
Recall that agreements include informal “gentlemen” agreements, thus it is difficult to draw a sharp 
line between agreements and concerted practices. This difficulty explains why since 1991 the CJEU 
established the concept of “complex infringement”, making, for practical purposes, the distinction 
between these two distinct types of cartel unnecessary (Rhône-Poulenc SA and others v. Commission 
of the European Communities, 1991, §127). Nevertheless, our points made in this section holds to 
the extent that there are cartels that are purely concerted practices.3 
In conclusion, it seems that leniency faces additional problems in cases of concerted practices. 
Interestingly, the main conceptual problem, i.e. to provide a clear and sharp definition of concerted 
practices, could be explained through game theory: competition between firms could be represented 
in repeated game theory as a prisoner’s dilemma, where both cooperation and collusion can appear 
as a Nash equilibrium without any exchange of information (Carlton et al., 1996, p. 428). We defer 
a short discussion of elementary game theory and leniency to section IV.
I I I. STRATEGIC LENIENCY
Strategic leniency signifies potential exploits of leniency that could generate detrimental effects. 
We, in turn, discuss three distinct ways how leniency could be exploited strategically: (1) used to 
punish cartel deviator (credible threat); (2) used as a cartel exit strategy (pre-emptive strike); (3) used 
to report false cartels hoping that rivals get fines (abuse of law).
Credible threat or punishment. Cartels are difficult to sustain. No conspiracy can neglect the 
problem of enforcement (Stigler, 1964, p. 46). Yet, collusion could be sustained through credible 
punishments. Thus, if cartel deviations could be punished through leniency, then it may reinforce 
collusion. The basic idea could be illustrated by hypothetical reasoning: imagine a duopoly cartel, 
where firm A deviates from a cartel but did not apply for leniency; then, firm B observes deviation 
and punishes firm A by applying for leniency; as a result, firm A gets fine, while firm B gets full im-
munity; understanding this risk, firm A sticks to collusion; therefore, the mere existence of leniency 
may reinforce collusion. There are several reasons, why firm A may consider a deviation profitable, 
but would not like to report itself a cartel to competition authority: (a) leniency only protects from 
public fines; (b) risk of claims for damages, especially, in the U.S. system with treble damages; (c) 
harm to firm’s reputation and share price; (d) legal restrictions for immunity claims: for example, 
cartel coercer cannot get full immunity under Leniency Notice (2006, item A(13)); (e) foregone op-
portunity to renegotiate cartel in the future, etc. It is important to note that by definition, a successful 
credible punishment (in the context of game theory) needs not to be realized, therefore it is difficult 
to know if firms actually conceive leniency as a credible punishment. Also note that reasons a – e, 
3  In section V we provide some examples of cartel cases that were qualified distinctly as concerted practices.
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hold for firm B as well, therefore, at least in some cases, threats of leniency could be non-credible 
(outside Nash equilibria).
This very idea of leniency as a credible threat has been explored by Spagnolo (2000), who con-
cluded that leniency could prevent cartel deviations even in one-shot Bertrand oligopolies. This 
result is based on the U.S. leniency rules, where a full immunity is possible only if leniency applicant 
makes full restitution to injured parties (Corporate Leniency Policy, 1993, item A(5)). By contrast, in 
the EU restitution of damages is not a necessary precondition to qualify for a full immunity under 
Leniency Notice (2006). The recovery of damages at the EU level depends on private litigation. For 
that reason, the Damages Directive has been adopted (Directive 2014/104/EU). Nevertheless, full 
restitution of cartel profits in the EU is not guaranteed even with the directive in place. Hence, given 
that a cartel deviator retains at least some of deviation profits, a strategy – to deviate from collu-
sion and simultaneously submit leniency application – could be in equilibrium, i.e. in such scenario 
leniency cannot be used as a credible threat or credible punishment, because the deviator himself 
applies for immunity before his rivals observe cheating. This strategy exactly refers to the second 
possible way to exploit leniency strategically.
Pre-emptive strike. The idea is that firms, which anticipate cartel collapse, may apply for leniency 
as pre-emptive strike (Blum et. al., 2008). They analysed the idea in the context of the German ce-
ment cartel of 2003, where leniency applicant (maverick) had an interest in launching a price war; the 
cartel was on a verge of collapsed anyways, thus applying for leniency was a smart, profit-maximising 
move, which prevented potential retaliation through leniency from other cartel members; authors 
claim that this strategic leniency increases individual market power, which could finally lead to mo-
nopoly and therefore is detrimental (Blum et. al., 2008, p. 211). Besides, we can think that leniency 
is unlikely to produce the disruptive effect (in cases like the abovementioned) because a cartel would 
have collapsed regardless of leniency due to the existence of a maverick firm. So, instead of giving 
an additional competitive advantage to a maverick firm and relieving it from fines, cartels could be 
traced from a price war.4
Abuse of law. From the Sokol’s (2012) survey emerges the third way of strategic leniency, which, 
by the majority of surveyed leading antitrust practitioners in the U.S. were described as a reality: 
firstly, a firm through leniency provide questionable information about alleged cartels in a “grey area” 
(where infringement itself is doubtful); secondly, rivals are exposed to costly antitrust investigation 
and are unwilling to litigate therefore accepts reduced fines, i.e. settle (Sokol, 2012, p. 212). In es-
sence, this resembles an abuse of law and causes a risk for false negatives. Perhaps the main “grey 
area” in EU cartel law is already mentioned difficulty in oligopolies to make a distinction between 
concerted practices (prohibited) and conscious parallelism (allowed). A closer look at the Leniency 
Notice (2006) reveals a legal gap: there are no rules or mechanisms to prevent these “cheap” leniency 
applications. The Leniency Notice (2006) could be improved by establishing new rules that would 
prevent and punish attempts to abuse leniency; as a result, it would not potentially save the EC’s 
4  It is hard to know, if this strategic use of leniency is widespread, because actual reasons for leniency applications re-
mains unknown, is not reported in decisions, and essentially remains known only for a decision-makers in a particular firm.
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limited resources but prevent false positives as well. Although there is no publicly available data on 
the rejected leniency applications (on the ground that there has been no infringement), since antitrust 
practitioners report the pervasiveness of this form of strategic leniency, it should not be ignored.
Overall, the reviewed literature suggests that leniency could be exploited both in passive and 
active ways. In the passive form, leniency exists merely as a potential, credible threat, which might 
never be realized, and which allows sustaining collusive profits. Unfortunately, this effect of leni-
ency is unobservable. In the active form, leniency might be used strategically: firstly, as a realized 
credible punishment, that is as an actual leniency submission, which results in fines; secondly, as a 
pre-emptive strike, i.e. used by the firm, who desires not only to deviate from a cartel but also to 
gain an additional competitive advantage by submitting leniency application before its rivals; thirdly, 
as a tool with the expectation that rivals will get significant fines, suffer from private litigation and 
reputational damage, especially in cases where at least some evidence is compatible with collusion, 
even though there is none. The latter might be conceived as a particular case of abuse of law.
IV. LENIENCY: GAME THEORY CONSIDERATIONS 
We further review some elementary game theory related to strategic leniency. A game is a model, 
which consists of players (firms), strategies (collude / deviate), and outcomes (profit). Games could 
be represented in strategic form (matric) or extended form (decision tree). In a well-known game 
of prisoner’s dilemma (PD), which is often used to analyse market behaviour, there is the unique 
Nash equilibrium (NE) – not cooperate (deviate). Accordingly, concerning leniency, the central idea is 
that competition authorities shall create PD, where reporting a cartel becomes a dominant strategy 
(Leslie, 2006). However, the unique NE in PD appears only in one-shot setting (Figure 1), whereas 
in repeated PD, where players interact repeatedly, cooperation (collusion) may emerge in NE. This 




Figure 1. Prisoner’s dilemma: cartel problem.
Note that cartel members cannot form legally enforceable cartel agreements or concerted 
practices because of legal restrictions (Article 101(2) of TFEU). Therefore, strategy profiles (deviate, 
deviate) forms the unique NE, meaning that in a one-shot PD collusion is unlikely. 
Does one-shot PD adequately depict the problem of leniency? McAdams (2008) argues that 
over-focus on PD obscures other insights from game theory on law. Leslie himself notes that com-
petition authorities usually have no evidence to prove a lesser crime as in generic PD, therefore the 
underlying game is rather a coordination game, where firms aim to mimic each other (Leslie, 2006, 
p. 457, 460). In this line of critique, we further notice that: (1) in case of leniency, unlike in original 
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PD, actual payoffs are never symmetric, because leniency is of sequential nature: if one firm gets 
immunity, then others could get only a reduction in fines; this asymmetry in payoffs is what creates 
a “racing” effect; (2) it is not clear how authorities could in practice “create” PD: if a cartel already 
formed despite the existence of leniency, then there is a little competition authority can actively do, 
except for finding infringement on their own5, which would disqualify firms from immunity under 
leniency rules in the first place (Leniency Notice, 2006, item II(10)); (3) in reality, firms usually inter-
act repeatedly, therefore a one-shot PD is naturally limited, thus it rather describes an end-game.
Repeated games provide a more realistic game theory approach to leniency. Not only firms 
usually interact repeatedly, but also in a repeated setting, unlike in a one-shot setting, the idea of 
punishment becomes relevant. Hence, strategic leniency refers to markets, where firms interact 
repeatedly. For our purpose, the most important difference between one-shot PD and infinitely or 
indefinitely repeated PD is that in the repeated setting there is no unique NE. To illustrate the point, 
let us consider once more the cartel game (Figure 1). Suppose that the same one-shot game is re-
peated indefinitely or infinitely. Then, based on a Folk theorem, strategy profiles (collude, collude) 
could be sustained as a Nash equilibrium, provided discount factor is sufficiently high (Fudenberg 
and Maskin, 1986). We need to make sure that strategy “collude” for both firms A and B are indeed 
individually rational and that there are no incentives to deviate, which could be expressed in the 
following inequality (Motta and Pollo, 2003):
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The inequality above assumes that DP (deviation profits) > CP (collusive profits) > NP (one-shot 
Nash equilibrium profits). The left-hand presents an infinite stream of collusive profits, provided that 
both firms A and B stick to collusion without any deviations, i.e. a stream of profits under perfectly 
stable collusion. By contrast, the right-hand shows overall profits, if a player decides to deviate 
instead. Namely, the deviator would get DP once and, starting with the next round, infinite stream 
of NP, which is discounted by because it takes exactly one round for the other firm to observe devia-
tion. Such a permanent return to the initial one-shot Nash equilibrium is a so-called “grim-trigger” 
strategy, which means that a single deviation triggers infinite punishment. The punishment itself 
should be in line with a Nash equilibrium to be credible. Notably, a stronger punishment, than the 
reversal to the one-shot Nash equilibrium strategy, is unlikely not only because a model would have 
to assume irrational behaviour, but also because that the Article 102 of TFEU prevents pricing below 
costs, which is considered as an abuse of dominant position.
By inserting payoffs of the cartel game into (1) inequality, we obtain that strategies (collude, col-
lude) form a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, provided that agents are sufficiently patient, which 
means that δ > 2/3 (see below). Therefore, collusion could be self-sustained in a repeated prisoners’ 
dilemma with two firms. 
5  As examined case law in section V shows, cartel detection outside leniency is almost nonexistent.
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Implications for strategic leniency. Firstly, Leslie’s (2006, p. 465) proposition that competition 
authorities should create PD, is not the end of the story, because collusion could be sustained as the 
Nash equilibrium in infinitely or indefinitely repeated games, including PD. Secondly, given full-im-
munity regime under leniency, the right-hand of inequality (1) remains unchanged, thus we can 
predict that a majority of cartel deviators (mavericks) will be whistle-blowers as in Blum et al. (2008). 
Nevertheless, leniency grants full-immunity only from public fines, meaning that exposed cartel may 
lead to private claims for damages, reputational harm, and similar negative effects on profits, which 
could reduce deviation profits (DP) in the first place, making use of leniency less likely even for a 
deviator. Thirdly, given that a cartel deviator does not apply for leniency, then it could be incorporated 
into a credible punishment strategy. In particular, rivals could not only play competitive one-shot NE 
strategies, which would give NP for a deviator but further impose harm that comes from antitrust 
fines, private damage claims, etc. In this sense, leniency functions as a credible threat or punishment: 
leniency allows punishing the deviator even more severely, than a simple reversal to one-shot NE 
strategy.6 Finally, since public fines and other negative effects from leniency application appears in 
the right-hand of inequality (1), we could conceive leniency as a special type of punishment, which 
ex ante may be exploited strategically and, consequently, reinforce collusion. This applies especially 
to duopolies and situations, where one or more firms are ineligible for leniency.
V. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In this section, we provide some findings based on the examined EU cartels with regards to previ-
ously raised issues of strategic leniency and concerted practices. During the period 2010–2018 there 
were in total 42 cartels investigated by the EC (Table 1 in the Appendix).
a)  General  observat ions
Leniency is the key source for cartel investigations. We found that 37/42 cartels originated from 
leniency (Table 1 in the Appendix). It shows the importance of leniency in cartel detection, but it 
does not show the effectiveness of leniency rules as such, because a total number of cartels (revealed 
and unrevealed), remains unknown (Harrington, 2008, p. 238). Also, the question arises, whether 
the EC, is sufficiently capable of finding cartels outside the framework of leniency, or perhaps, leni-
ency generates enough workflow, which exhausts the EC’s resources for stand-alone investigations. 
The ratio of prohibition decisions tends to decrease. We found that the EC adopted prohibition 
decisions in 33/42 of cases (Table 1 in the Appendix). Figure 2 below shows that prohibition decisions 
6  In addition, note that in a case of duopoly, leniency could become a targeted punishment. In principle, every restric‑
tion on eligibility of leniency brings leniency closer to a targeted punishment. Therefore, we could argue that coercers and 
instigators of cartels should not be barred from a full‑immunity under leniency rules in order to neutralize pro‑collusive 
effects, which comes from the existence of targeted punishments.
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tend to slightly decrease in relation to other types of decisions. One possible explanation would be 
that after the development of a sufficient level of legal practice and legal certainty, firms are less 
willing to litigate. This tendency is in line with the fact that the majority of cartel investigations come 
from leniency, meaning that there usually exists strong internal incriminating evidence. 






Prohibition Decisions Other decisions
 
  Figure 2. Prohibition decisions.
We observe very limited disruptive effect, at least immediate, of 2002 leniency reform on pre-
reform cartels. Assuming that “automatic leniency” is a major improvement in leniency rules (Spag-
nolo, 2008, p. 266, 290), which were introduced in the EU in 2002, we were able to test, whether the 
reform generated immediate disruptive effect on cartels that have formed before 2002 (pre-reform 
cartels). Based on strategic considerations, pre-reform and post-reform cartels are in a different posi-
tion. Namely, rational firms that have formed cartels after the reform at a stage of cartel formation 
had to take into consideration improved or “effective” leniency rules, which posed a substantially 
higher risk of being caught, in comparison with those cartels that formed before the reform with 
“ineffective” leniency rules or no leniency rules at all.7 This strategic consideration is also reflected 
in formal models, such as in Motta and Polo (2003), where they incorporate leniency into deviation 
strategies. We found 15/42 relevant cases, where cartels formed before the reform. It appears that 
only in the DRAMS case leniency application has been submitted within 1 year after the entry into 
force of 2002 leniency rules (12th of February 2002). From this, we conclude that the 2002 leniency 
reform had very limited, at least immediate, disruptive effect on pre-reform cartels. This observation 
suggests that leniency is likely not that strong or even a primary precursor of why cartels collapse.
b)  Observat ions  regarding concerted pract ices
We looked for cases, where (1) leniency was the original source of cartel investigation (37/42 
cartels), and (2) infringements were qualified distinctly as concerted practices. Not a single case 
matched these two requirements. This seems to reinforce our previous proposition that leniency 
is not adequate for concerted practices. Almost all infringements have been qualified as complex 
infringements (Table 1 in the Appendix). 
7  Especially, if we take into consideration the fact that stand‑alone cartel detection, i.e. outside the framework of lenien‑
cy are rare (see the previous trend).
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We argue that it is equally important to catch infringements that are distinctly concerted practices 
because harm to competition could be the same or comparable to harm from complex infringements 
or cartel agreements. Also, cases, which are distinctly concerted practices, are not just a theoretical 
possibility, but occur in practice: for instance, in cases of ICI v. Commission (1972), Suiker Unie and 
Others v. Commission (1975), where the concept of concerted practices has been established; in cases 
of T-Mobile and Others (2009) and Dole Food v. Commission (2015), where exchanges of information 
were found as distinct examples of concerted practices; or more recently, in case of Eturas and Oth-
ers (2016), where the CJEU clarified that a sending of information (about a planned discount cap) by 
electronic platform administrator may amount to concerted practices. 
Furthermore, it seems that the development of the concept of concerted practices has been, at 
least to some extent, stalled by the emergence of the concept of complex infringement. Currently, 
we have a situation, where those early judgments of concerted practices still play a major role in 
judicial reasoning about concerted practices, even though the competitive environment significantly 
changed in past decades. If we consider a previously noted trend that the ratio of prohibition decisions, 
where the EC can develop concepts, tend to decrease, we can further raise the question not only, 
if leniency is effective for concerted practices, but also, whether the concept of concerted practices 
in a future could deal with more unconventional cartels that employ artificial intelligence, such as 
algorithmic pricing. It is hard to expect effective enforcement for more sophisticated and less intense 
forms of collusion (especially in the absence of direct communication or other contacts), without 
further developments of leniency and concerted practices.
c)  Observat ions  regarding strategic  leniency
By checking, whether cartel collapses were shortly followed by leniency applications, we could 
discern whether firms potentially used leniency strategically as a cartel exit strategy (pre-emptive 
strike). By “shortly” we assumed 6 months.8 Due to imperfections in data, we further assumed:
(1) That the EC’s reaction time to make down raids or requests for information upon receipt of initial 
leniency application is on average 3 months. There is no specified term for the EC to act on initial 
receipt of a leniency application, but 3 months average term is mentioned by the EC’s representa-
tives (Parliamentary questions E-0890/09, E-0891/09, E-0892/09, 2009). We also deduce same 
3 months term from our data, where the EC provide both a date on initial leniency application 
and date on its down raids or requests for information (Table 3 in the Appendix);
(2) That the EC properly determine actual cartel duration. In practice, a cartel duration may be slightly 
different from what the EC was able to prove. This is because in some cases the EC may have had 
a lack of sufficient evidence to prove a longer infringement. Also, even if firms submit leniency 
applications, they might have incentives to misrepresent the duration of cartels, because they 
8  Note, however, that depending on a market, its transparency, firms’ ability to detect deviations, frequency of price 
changes, and other factors, a term for using leniency as a credible punishment or as an exit strategy may vary. In any case, 
our data allows examining the same question with shorter or longer periods as well.
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might be not the first to report cartel and therefore not be eligible for full immunity, or they 
might have had simply destroyed evidence in the past, etc. Therefore, the real duration of each 
cartel might be longer than established in the EC’s decisions. In the absence of alternatives, it 
was natural to adopt the dates provided in the EC’s decisions.
We find that in 20/37 of cases cartel collapses were shortly followed by leniency submissions, 
which is in line with the idea of strategic leniency as a pre-emptive strike (Table 4 in the Appendix). 
However, the remaining 17/37 of cases did not follow the pattern, so we cannot provide very strong 
conclusions for strategic leniency. In addition, these 17/37 cases also could be interpreted against 
the effectiveness of leniency: even though cartels collapse, firms are still hesitant to rush to submit 
leniency applications sometimes for years. This behaviour again could be partially explained by 
limitations of leniency and usual arguments that firms fear private claims for damages, price wars, 
reputational harm, foreclosed opportunity to renegotiate cartels, etc., which sometimes might out-
weight the benefits of leniency, whereas an impetus for eventual leniency applications might be a 
belief that rivals will soon do so.
Finally, our cursory search in Lithuanian case law adds a further glimpse of evidence in support of 
Sokol’s (2012, p. 212) survey, where the U.S. leading antitrust practitioners noted a reality of strategic 
leniency. In the Lithuanian Internal Combustion Engine (2017) duopoly case, one defendant put for-
ward arguments that the other defendant intentionally submitted leniency application to completely 
eliminate competition from its only rival in the market. However, the Supreme Administrative Court 
of the Republic of Lithuania rejected these arguments on the ground that law did not require check-
ing true intentions behind leniency submissions. This shows that the concept of strategic leniency 
and its various modes are not yet fully acknowledged by legal authorities and fall outside current 
legal assessment. However, we think that at least in the most severe attempts to abuse leniency, i.e. 
with the aim to harm rivals and gain competitive advantage, it should be prohibited and fall within a 
domain of legal assessment. For that purpose, the current legal gap in the EU competition law should 
be filled by establishing legal norms that would prevent abuse of leniency.
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Strategic leniency is the idea that comes from game-theoretic considerations of leniency. It gained 
some attention in theoretical research by legal and economic scholars, but for the most part, the 
idea is overlooked by competition authorities and courts. We can think of three distinct aspects of 
strategic leniency.
(1) Leniency implies that firms, who want to deviate from a cartel arrangement but does not want 
to be exposed to private litigation, reputational harm, etc. could be threatened by rival cartel 
members, who can punish such deviations by applying for leniency. This possibility may ex ante 
reinforce collusion and prevent deviations in the first place. Since credible threats or punish-
ments by definition need not be realised to be effective, this way of strategic leniency remains 
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unobservable. Therefore, it is hard to know, if firms actually conceive leniency this way, or it is 
merely a theoretical construct.
(2) On the other hand, if a cartel is on a verge of collapse and cartel deviator finds it profitable to 
deviate regardless of private litigation, reputational harm, etc., then a strategy “deviation + leni-
ency application” could be a dominant strategy, which could work as a pre-emptive strike, i.e. 
could prevent potential punishment through leniency by rival firms. In such cases, where cartels 
are destined to collapse due to maverick firm, leniency may give an extra competitive advantage 
to a deviator, which in a long term may help the maverick firm to create or strengthen its domi-
nant position or even eliminate competition. We find some support for the “deviation + leniency 
application” strategy in the EC case law, but strong conclusions would be unwarranted.
(3) Finally, when the line between legal and illegal behaviour is thin (e.g. in so-called oligopoly prob-
lem, where it is difficult to distinguish between concerted practices and conscious parallelism), 
firms may submit false leniency applications to gain competitive advantage by getting full immunity 
under leniency and exposing rivals to fines. This may lead to false positives and inefficient use 
of limited resources of the EC. Currently, the EU leniency rules have no legal norms to prevent 
such abuses of law. Therefore, one possible solution would be to introduce fines for procedural 
attempts to abuse leniency.
Through the analysis of 2010–2018 EC’s cartel cases, we found that the 2002 EU leniency reform 
had no disruptive effect, at least immediate, on pre-reform cartels. This finding supports the scholar-
ship position, which argues that the EC tends to overemphasize the effectiveness of leniency. Besides, 
both theoretical considerations and empirical evidence suggest that leniency is unlikely to reveal 
concerted practices. As a rule, the EC qualifies cartels as complex infringements, but this practice 
has negative implications for the development of the concept of concerted practices, which is argu-
ably critical in addressing emerging problems in competition law caused by artificial intelligence and 
algorithmic pricing. 
Despite the critique, leniency remains (and likely will be) the single most important source for 
cartel detection. Examined cases indeed show that the EC rarely find infringements outside the 
framework of leniency, even cartels last for five or even more years. Therefore, to make leniency 
more effective, strategic considerations should be taken into account in future developments of 
leniency and concerted practices, which in turn may help to address emerging problems in digital 
markets or due to artificial intelligence. Game theory as methodology could be fruitfully employed 
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